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David James Gill. Britain and the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy, 19641970. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014. Pp. 299.
Compared to the others with seats at the nuclear table, Britain’s
status as a nuclear power has often been scrutinised in a curious
manner. As other nations gained power and influence following the
Second World War, Britain’s empire was in an obvious decline.
Even so, Britain clung to relevance on the global stage as a secondtier power below the superpowers. The price of admittance to this
tier was an expensive nuclear programme, one that was growing
increasingly hard to sustain due to commitments to the welfarestate and decolonisation. For decades academics have questioned
the existence of Britain’s nuclear programme with theories focusing
on images of national pride, Cold War strategies and military
logistics. However, as David James Gill, an associate professor in
the School of Politics and International Relations at the University
of Nottingham, argues, “the reality of nuclear weapons in British
history [is] far more mundane” (p. 12). Gill is part of a small yet
growing group of historians focusing on Britain’s struggling post-war
economy as a practical answer to the question of Britain’s continued
commitment to nuclear weapons, with Britain seeing it as “a way
to reduce the financial burden of conventional forces” (p. 23). The
usage of the incredibly expensive programme as a way to save costs
seems paradoxical yet Gill’s text provides an intriguing explanation,
asserting that the expensive deterrent was believed to be cheaper
than its equivalent in conventional forces.
Gill’s monograph, Britain and the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy
1964-1970, provides a detailed study of Prime Minister Harold
Wilson’s first government (1964-1970), as well as a satisfying account
of Britain’s nuclear programme from its origins to the Chevaline/Super
Antelope debate following Wilson’s second government (1974-1976).
Through Gill’s thorough grasp of economics and politics, the six years
of Wilson’s first government are revealed as a monumental balancing
act with Wilson committing to an expensive nuclear deterrent in
times of economic crisis. Gill follows the economic realities of the
nuclear programme in a captivating manner, depicting Wilson’s first
government as a pivotal era in which Britain’s nuclear programme
teetered on the edge of cancellation. These often unconsidered financial
debates quickly reveal that “economic difficulties were not limited to
communist countries. Destabilising crises troubled successive British
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governments. Had the [1970’s] gold crisis worsened, it is likely Wilson
would have conceded cancellation [of the bomb]” (p. 204). These and
other turning points in British military history, such as the 1968
announcement of the removal of troops east of the Suez Canal, are
dutifully recounted throughout the text.
Gill’s thesis is convincingly argued through four broad themes,
the first being a detailed account of the post-war British economy
and the fascinating way Britain’s nuclear programme oscillated
between cancellation and continued investment as “the British bomb
was a diplomatic and economic tool as much as a strategic or military
weapon” (p. 33). Even those familiar with modern British military
history may be surprised to see how close the nuclear programme
came to an end under Wilson’s government. A second theme is the
British government’s continued flirtation with possible nuclear sharing
arrangements such as the Multilateral Force, the Atlantic Nuclear
Force and the Polaris programme as “a lever to prise dollars from the
u. s . Treasury to bail out the British economy” (p. 85). The British
desire to maintain an independent deterrent while requiring much
needed contributions from the United States adds yet another layer of
complication to an already strained government. Similarly, Gill argues
a third theme, chronicling Britain’s consideration of disarmament to
improve their chances of joining the European Economic Community
(eec) which demonstrates that “[Wilson] was an economist before
a diplomat” (p. 33). In the wake of Brexit, reading the numerous
stratagems that Britain deployed to maintain their nuclear programme
while maneuvering themselves into the eec provide fascinating and
politically relevant reading today. Lastly, British historians will
be familiar with the theory of political consensus that supported
Britain’s commitment to the post-war welfare state. Gill’s fourth
theme explores another consensus, the lengthy bipartisan consensus to
maintain the nuclear deterrent, and how Wilson’s machinations in the
Labour party “obscured fundamental similarities with Conservative
nuclear policy” (p. 105).
Gill’s economic focus is an important contribution to the multitude
of texts exploring Britain’s commitment to nuclear weapons and his
usage of primary economic sources and secondary works should by
all accounts be considered a success. Peter Hennessey is an eminent
writer on the history of Britain’s nuclear programme and Gill uses
several of his works to a great extent, adding an important—and
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necessary—layer of economics to the historiography.1 Articles by
Matthew Grant and Kristen Stoddart, both influential British nuclear
historians, are also well used, though Grant’s similarly themed 2010
book, After the Bomb, which explores budget cuts and the nuclear
programme, is oddly absent from Gill’s bibliography.2 As Gill argues,
“a commitment to investment in nuclear weapons therefore not only
reduced the available defence budget but also encouraged further cuts”
(p. 137). These “further cuts” are hinted towards but left unfortunately
unexplored, particularly the culture surrounding the shrinking civil
defence programmes and the resulting reverberations in the British
population. For those curious about the discourse between the public
and the government’s dwindling civil defence measures, such as the
Protect and Survive programme which was started during Wilson’s
second government, a 2012 article from James Stafford titled “‘Stay
at Home’: The Politics of Nuclear Civil Defence, 1968-83” provides
complementary reading to Britain and the Bomb.3
For those interested in similar recent texts, Jonathan Hogg’s
2016 book, British Nuclear Culture: Official and Unofficial
Narratives in the Long 20th Century, can further serve those
intrigued by the economics of Britain’s nuclear deterrent while also
providing a captivating examination of concepts of nuclear culture
in British society—which both welcomed and protested Britain’s
nuclear programme.4 Gill’s book is a dense but jargon-free review
of the economics of a turbulent time in British history that should
serve any academic interested in nuclear or Wilsonian politics and
economics. Ultimately, the reader finds satisfaction with Gill’s text
as well as his central thesis that “nuclear history is a [...] complicated
process, influenced by economics and politics, as well as diplomacy
and strategy” (p. 3).
joseph a. buscemi, university of waterloo

1  
Hennessy’s The Secret State: Preparing For The Worst 1945-2010 (London:
Penguin UK, 2014) is required reading for any modern Britain historian and his
Cabinets and the Bomb (Oxford: Oxford University Press/British Academy, 2007)
should be considered the same.
2  
Matthew Grant, After the Bomb: Civil Defence and Nuclear War in Britain, 194568 (Basingstoke, UK; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
3  
James Stafford, “‘Stay at Home’: The Politics of Nuclear Civil Defence, 1968–83,”
Twentieth Century British History 23, no. 3 (September 1, 2012): 383–407.
4  
Jonathan Hogg, British Nuclear Culture: Official and Unofficial Narratives in the
Long 20th Century (London, UK: Bloomsbury, 2016).
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